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Abstract
The article deals with modern trends in safety management systems at airports. These include Safety II,
Paperless SMS, transference of confidence and responsibility to operating employees, and creation of a system
to ensure safety at the airport despite the potential for human error.
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1. Introduction
The area of aviation safety has been experiencing a rapid
development. This is due to the evolution of the safety the-
ory [1][2], but also the constant refinement and supplement
of aviation safety standards based on newly gained knowl-
edge and experience from operations, both at the global and
regional levels. Recently, the Annex 19 to the Chicago Con-
vention has been updated to the second edition [3]. The ICAO
9859 Safety Management Manual is also being updated to the
fourth edition [4]. Changes related to the implementation of
new regulations, in particular [5] and [6], are gradually being
implemented in the European Union. All these changes move
the Safety management systems to greater complexity and
quantity of information that have to be processed. This needs
to be reflected in every civil aviation organization, including
Prague Airport.
Va´clav Havel Airport Prague handled 15,415,001 passen-
gers in 2017, an increase of 17.9% over 2016. This confirms
its status of one of the fastest growing Group 2 airports in
Europe, a category pertaining to 10 – 25 million passengers.
Compared to the previous 5 years, the recent rise in passen-
ger numbers at Va´clav Havel Airport Prague constitutes a
double digit increase – the first time this has occurred in the
history of the airport. Overall, European airports reported an
increase of 8.7% for the year. The most successful month in
2017 was July, which saw 1,703,193 travellers pass through
the premises. On average, Prague Airport handled 42,233
passengers every day.
Figure 1. Evolution of passenger movement in the past 5
years
Another record-breaking number refers to movement at
Va´clav Havel Airport Prague last year – 148,283 take-offs
and landings in total. This upswing was due to new airlines
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operating out of Va´clav Havel Airport Prague, opening up
new routes and increasing the capacity of existing ones [7].
In 2017, the network of air routes from the airport was ex-
tended to encompass 16 new destinations. Furthermore, 2
more routes were opened to additional airports in existing
destinations (London City and London Southend). In general,
it would seem that people are now willing to spend more on
travel, in addition to which flights have become more afford-
able.
In 2017, a total 69 regular airlines operated out of Va´clav
Havel Airport Prague, flying to 163 destinations. Most pas-
sengers travelled from Prague to elsewhere in Europe or to
Africa; traffic to the latter rising by more than 66% annually,
driven by tremendous interest in holidaying in the north of
the continent. Most flights were destined for the United King-
dom (15 destinations, +6.61%), followed by Italy (+29.6%),
Germany (+8.1%), Russia (+24.56%) and France (+9.02%).
London proved to be the biggest attraction, as usual; indeed,
passengers can now fly to all six international London airports.
The next most popular cities were Paris, Moscow, Amsterdam
and Frankfurt.
2. Safety II and Other Recent Trends
2.1 Safety II at Prague Airport
Such dramatically increased operation of an airport, as de-
scribed above, gives rise to safety hazards, hence close scrutiny
has to be paid to any development in aviation safety. Notably,
the immense growth in traffic in 2017 did not have any ad-
verse impact in this respect. On the contrary, aviation safety
indicators show better results over those of the previous year.
LKPR has demonstrated a positive track record in this area.
Nevertheless, room for improvement still exists, and steps are
being taken by implementing the following:
1. traffic control at the crossing of TWY D/F and RWY
12/30, with two existing and two new stop bars;
2. separation of RWY 12/30 from RWY 06/24 or introduc-
tion of a completely new RWY 06R/24L to eliminate
the risk of RWY incursion;
3. Airport hydrant fuel distribution systems to reduce the
risk of aircraft damage during handling operations.
In 2016-17, the decision was taken to enhance two of the
highest monitored safety indicators: RWY incursion and dam-
age to aircraft from handling operations. Under the auspices
of the RWY and APRON safety teams, the Safety department
developed prevention programmes so that Letisˇteˇ Praha, a.s.
and co-operating organisations could take measures to reduce
the number of incidents, e.g. by conducting further training
on local airport traffic rules. Indeed, said programmes have
been introduced and both indicators show welcome annual
improvements; the number of RWY incursion incidents has
dropped from 10 to 8, while only 6 incidents of minor aircraft
damage were reported last year as compared to 13 in 2016.
The primary cause of all such incidents was human error.
The risk of this can be mitigated through properly selecting
employees, analysing their motivations, and providing train-
ing and practical experience. However, the risk cannot be
completely eliminated. The expectation is that RWY incur-
sions and aircraft damage shall occur in 2018. Therefore, the
purpose is to not devise a system free of human error but one
that remains safe even if mistakes are made; sufficient safety
barriers shall promptly reveal any instance of human error and
prevent exacerbation of the situation. The system currently
in place flagged up all such incidents in a timely fashion in
2017, except for two circumstances at the risky crossing of
TWY D/F and RWY 12/30. To this end, a proposal was made
in 2017 to enhance safety measures by adding two new STOP
bars, which is a priority in 2018.
A new certificate pursuant to Commission Regulation
(EU) 139/2014, issued by the Civil Aviation Authority, con-
firms the high level of safety now in place.
2.2 Key Safety Incidents and Thrie Causes
The obvious priority of any airport safety department is to
closely monitor all matters of concern, especially RWY incur-
sions, and the employees at LKPR are no exception. We do
our utmost to prevent any unauthorised entries into RWY, as
they may result in accidents if other safety barriers also fail.
The causes of the worst aviation accidents in the history
have rightly attracted great attention. Unfortunately, RWY
incursion incidents are here to stay, although the acts (risks)
of instigating the same change over time. Flawed technical
equipment was a weakness that has since been overcome.
Hence, the greatest risk at present is that such incidents are
caused by the human factor. Most mistakes appear to be made
by crews, even in relatively simple situations which used to
be trouble free. The department at Prague Airport has been
looking into circumstances like these. They may be due to
an ever greater number of tasks that have to be performed
when taxiing, the high data requirement for crews from all
sides, attempts to make up for delays, and/or the growing
complexity of airports. We look for causes at the very start
of the career of a pilot. In the past, candidates for jobs in the
civil aviation sector were people with experience, who had
been members of flying clubs or in the military. Nowadays, it
is commonplace that candidates take and pass a short (frozen)
0-ATPL course. In fact, some incidents have occurred at the
airport and elsewhere abroad that suggest this type of training
is not sufficient to help pilots master all procedures.
The most frequent human error committed in RWY Safety
is the failure to stop at a RWY holding point. Investigation
usually reveals that crews have made this mistake, believing
incorrectly that they had obtained permission. This represents
a particularly dangerous trend, and preventing it is severely
complicated for the infrastructure operator. Today, holding
points are very clearly marked. However, it would seem that
no matter how many signs - information or regulatory - are
placed, or the sheer number of information campaigns con-
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ducted, the taxiing crew still believes that permission has been
granted. The only effective infrastructure measure would be
to introduce STOP bars use H24/7, which is not commonplace
in Europe.
Nevertheless, the present advantage is that highly ad-
vanced, technological safety barriers are in place which sup-
plement the skills of staff at the airport. Consequently, it is
very likely that the current system will immediately detect a
RWY incursion incident, permitting sufficient time to respond
to the situation before it worsens and lives are endangered.
2.3 Safety II
The Safety Management System (SMS) has witnessed devel-
opment to at least the same degree of rapidity as other areas
of aviation. Although the wording stated in ICAO Annex 19
has not been altered to any great extent, advancements in new
methodologies and concepts mark the way forward. The data
collected by SMS, as implemented today, is the means by
which this otherwise subjective area of study can be analysed,
permitting description and presentation of the seriousness
and probability of risks. In past decades, airport operators
only gathered data on the most serious incidents, and infor-
mation on paper was hard to process manually. Today, SMS
amasses data on numerous safety-related incidents, controlled
changes and the results of inspections and audits, as well as
data seemingly unrelated to operational safety. Such data
are stored in digital format, structured and easily accessible,
hence processing them is straightforward. Giving rise to far
more than mere statistics, the data is utilised for targeted per-
formance management through smart safety indicators. We
at the airport consider an indicator to be a statistical index
of a certain safety risk - one which evolves over time, has
a target value and can be potentially derived by SMS tools.
Contrarily, it also possesses a critical value that should be
avoided, which generates a red flag whenever a situation is
gauged as approaching such a value. All such functions are a
feature of specialised SMS software, i.e. programs providing
an online overview of safety measures and warning when a
critical value of a safety indicator is met.
Nevertheless, all of the above equates to nothing more
than Safety I, a traditional approach to operational safety
introduced at the very outset of aviation, the purpose of which
is to attempt to identify causes of safety-related incidents.
In other words, endeavour is made to discern the origins of
an incident, why the net result is not as expected, the cause
of technical failure, why employees did not comply with
procedures, and so on.
Today, since aviation has become a very safe means of
transport and the rate of safety-related incidents is very low
compared to the number of operations (flights, handling, etc.),
a completely new approach has emerged. In spite of the
sheer volume of operations taking place on a daily basis,
scant data actually relate to the safety-related incidents we
experience. Whenever we at LKPR try to find out how and
why something went wrong, usually only certain statistics are
Table 1. Principal differences between Safety I and Safety II
according to source material [8]
Safety-I Safety-II
Definition of
safety
That as few thing as
possible go wrong.
That as many things
as possible go right.
Safety man-
agement
principle
Reactive, respond
when something hap-
pens or is categorised
as an unacceptable
risk.
Proactive, contin-
uously trying to
anticipate develop-
ments and events.
View of the
human fac-
tor in safety
management
Humans are predomi-
nantly seen as a liabil-
ity or hazard.
Humans are seen as
a resource necessary
for system flexibility
and resilience.
Accident
investigation
Accidents are caused
by failures and mal-
functions. The pur-
pose of an investiga-
tion is to indentify the
causes.
Things basically hap-
pen in the same way,
regardless of the out-
come. The pur-
pose of an investi-
gation is to under-
stand how things usu-
ally go right as a
basis for explaining
how things occasion-
ally go wrong.
Risk assess-
ment
Accidents are caused
by failures and mal-
functions. The pur-
pose of an investi-
gation is to identify
causes and contribu-
tory factors.
To understand the
conditions where per-
formance variability
can become difficult
or impossible to mon-
itor and control.
available to us, which might paint an inaccurate picture of the
given circumstance.
Therefore, we have adopted the Safety II approach to
developments in aviation and operational safety.
Safety II offers an opposite approach to aviation safety.
It seeks out and explores causes as to why the anticipated
outcome is achieved in the absolute majority of cases, so in
essence it explores what leads to correct consequences and
reinforces proper workflow practices. Safety II attempts to
describe the various reasons why things go to plan, and then
finds ways to build on these to the greatest possible extent. It is
obvious that such an optimistic approach acts as an incentive
for further safety enhancements, but it is more exacting and
precise than that. It generates a great deal of statistically
relevant data, from which causes for positive outcomes can
be detected.
In practice, Safety II is applied for inspecting aircraft han-
dling processes. Every year, the SMS at Prague Airport is
used to carry out hundreds of such inspections, each one in-
volving assessment of more than 80 sub-procedures by Safety
Inspectors.
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Figure 2. Focus of Safety I and Safety II according to source
material [8]
Gathering data is simple, paperless and effective thanks
to the SMS software. The online database acts as the reposi-
tory of information entered by the Safety Inspector directly
from the site of inspection, via a tablet connected to a Wi-Fi
network. Any manual processing of the data is minimal, since
it is only necessary to check the data and attach photographs
and video recordings.
Staff at the airport also utilise a compliance system. This
means we know exactly which handling procedures have been
complied with properly and regularly by employees, a sign
of being able to rely on them. As for other procedures where
compliance is not 100%, we check the relevant data to learn
whether a mistake has been made or non-compliance has
been encountered before. Afterwards, an investigation looks
into the cause of any non-compliance, i.e. whether procedures
have been wrongly implemented or circumvented for whatever
reason.
From the description given above, it is apparent that the
new inspection system is not solely a Safety II approach, but
one that also applies Safety I in parallel. This shall remain
the case for other applications, too. In fact, Safety II has not
replaced Safety I but complemented it instead, hence both
methods coexist and are linked together.
2.4 Complexity and Flexibility
The development of Safety II is, up to a point, informed by
the growing complexity of aviation procedures. In fact, it is
quite likely that the time will come when it is necessary to
change the approach taken to operational safety. The days
when all aircraft were handled identically have passed. Now
each operator (i.e. client) typically has different requirements
for handling in terms of scope, speed and procedure; indeed,
it is not unusual for the demands of different operators to vary.
Specifically, a procedure which is expressly requested by one
operator could be strictly prohibited by another. An example
of this is the standard procedure for placing a ground service
equipment to an aircraft. Transport Rules and numerous op-
erators request the presence of a driver and another person
to provide assistance in the form of navigation, so the item
is placed safely without damage being caused to the aircraft.
However, other operators prohibit such a procedure.
The present state of affairs is that each aircraft is handled
according to a unique set of procedures, depending on the
operator, handling organisation, type of aircraft and aircraft
stand. Rather than comprising uniform handling processes;
it is a system made up of immense derogation and numerous
exceptions. Endeavour has been made to capture all the vari-
ous derogations, integrate them into procedures and train staff
accordingly, but the quantity of documentation and variety of
processes continues to multiply manyfold. There is a limit
to the human capacity to remember complex procedures and
exceptions. If this has not been exceeded yet, then it will be
in the future unless the current approach is altered.
Any attempt to describe every single eventuality in a given
procedure is essentially odd and overly bureaucratic. In con-
trast, following the path of flexibility and resilience is the way
forward. Instead of creating complex written procedures, oper-
ators should encourage employees to be flexible and resilient,
to handle the ever growing complexity on their own, get their
bearings and make the right decision. In other words, there
is a need to inspire confidence in and transfer responsibility
to relevant employees. These aspects have been overlooked
for the past 20 years, and it is the belief of the authors that
they should be restored, at least to some extent. However, this
hinges upon meeting one particular condition. Civil aviation
has to attract qualified and responsible employees, people that
are well-educated, correctly selected and properly trained; in-
deed, aviation should be at the core of their very being. There
would also be a need to provide sufficient financial remuner-
ation for such individuals. To this end, the ideal situation
would be to attract a large number of applicants for posts in
order to choose the best candidates from among them. This
is certain to be extremely difficult for handling organisations
that are already facing tough competition due to the enormous
pressure brought to bear by aircraft operators to reduce costs.
Shortage of staff is rife and is being reported by all organ-
isations.
2.5 Paperless SMS
The latest trend is a growing demand for incident and change
documentation, inclusion of less significant events and modi-
fications, and every little detail besides. This is apparent not
only in aviation, but also in society as a whole, and there does
not seem to be any sign of it coming to an end soon. For
this reason, SMS has to face up to constraints in capacity.
Basically, the human resources currently available are insuf-
ficient to fulfil all the requirements imposed by regulations
and the national regulator. A possibility exists to expand the
number of safety inspectors to a certain point. However, there
is a lack of qualified experts in the labour market, so one
way of resolving the situation would be to take on and train
up young graduates, for instance, or retrain employees from
other departments. Alternatively, beyond increasing the scale
of human resources, further capacity could be facilitated by
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easing the workload of the existing inspectors, simplifying
SMS procedures, limiting bureaucracy and clarifying the SMS
process in general.
Overall, the number of safety-related incidents reported
has risen in the long-term; email is the usual means of commu-
nication for these. With respect to each incident, the operator
is required to perform the following tasks: confirm receipt of
the given information; log the incident in the database; assess
the severity of it; conduct an investigation; arrive at a decision
on safety recommendations; and provide the incident reporter
with the resultant data on how the incident was eventually
resolved. Afterwards, it is necessary to monitor corrective
measures and ensure that deadlines are met by responsible
persons. Once again, this has to be entered into the database
and assessed. As mentioned above, this process is normally
done by email. Notably, such communications are not linked
with the log in the database and are not tractable later, since
the incident is resolved through multiple agents cooperating
together.
Since 2015, the rate of change to infrastructure and pro-
cedure has risen dramatically (i.e. frequency of repairs, new
structures, planned development, variety of aircraft, etc.).
Therefore, it is necessary to assess in advance, via the change
management process, whether any such alteration would be
reasonably safe to implement. Presently, the regulator re-
quests that the airport operator documents safety matters with
relevant studies, even for changes where this was not cus-
tomary in the past. The scope and complexity of the change
management process has grown excessively, and this trend is
set to continue once new EASA legislation is introduced.
In light of the growing number of entries, it is necessary
to keep track of changes which have been assessed and in
what manner, as well as of pending modifications and the
status of investigations. If data for the SMS is communicated
solely by email, it cannot be excluded that some information
will be flagged as spam and blocked, or end up overlooked or
hidden among other incoming correspondence. Hence, there
is no guarantee that such data are referred for resolution in
time or undergo assessment or investigation, or that emails on
fulfilling safety recommendations are not lost.
The biggest weakness of the SMS at Prague Airport is
that online information on safety is not accessible by any unit
other than the Safety Department.
Applications that support the Safety Management System
are currently under development, potentially eliminating pa-
per documents and facilitating data flow. These would handle
everything from the initial report and risk assessment, through
to detailed investigation of safety recommendations and mon-
itoring whether they are fulfilled. Furthermore, modules are
available for the purpose of audits and inspection, providing
the most elaborated statistical outputs and analytical options.
Another benefit is that the Safety Department does not have
to deal with any paperwork or process management or worry
about searching for emails, allowing staff to focus on what
is crucial - the data on operational safety. Potential solutions
such as these are under consideration at present.
A possible improvement is that information from the
Safety Department would be distributed to operating staff,
strengthening links with safety. In essence, the board would
have a “live” picture of safety matters, current “risks” of the
operation, up-to-date reports on incidents, their severity and
the status of any investigation, a “heat” map of the riskiest
points, any completed studies and audits. Operating staff
would also obtain similar information, and a clear online
overview of live safety recommendations and their state of
implementation.
Additionally, incident reporters would gain the opportu-
nity to send safety reports, including anonymous ones. They
would also be able to click a link and find out how a report
has been handled, whether it is being resolved and the current
outcome. Clear links between incidents and changes with
safety recommendations and their implementation could exist.
Moreover, responsible persons and SMS employees would
automatically be advised of upcoming deadlines of corrective
measures. Furthermore, investigating the causes of an inci-
dent would take less time due to the resultant reduction in
paperwork for reporting data on incidents.
With the aid of software, the SMS can continue to func-
tion in an orderly fashion despite the growth in entries and
extra demand for increased human resources. It will also be
transparent and interactive, supporting a Safety (Just) culture
establishing a stronger link between the Safety Department
and operating staff, incident reporters and the Board of Direc-
tors. The reporting process for safety staff will be improved,
as will awareness of the overall safety-related situation at
Prague Airport, with the possibility of heightened, efficient
response to safety risks.
3. Conclusion
Long-term, targeted regulation under the leadership of ICAO
has made it possible for global aviation to achieve a high level
of operational safety. For instance, this is proven by statistical
data from 2017, reporting nil jet aircraft crashes for the period,
which is an outstanding result. The situation today is that
all the operational safety requirements of ICAO have been
met satisfactorily. The staff at Prague Airport have exceeded
aviation regulations to devise new methodologies, concepts
and technologies to make the SMS even more precise and
effective, as well as to facilitate sufficient capacity to handle
the growing requirements of regulations and the regulator and
for anticipated growth in air traffic in Europe.
References
[1] N Leveson. Engineering a Safer World: Systems Thinking
Applied to Safety. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 2012.
[2] E Hollnagel. Safety-II in Practice: Developing the Re-
silience Potentials. Taylor & Francis, 2017.
10
L. Kurzweil, V. Rˇehorˇ SAFETY II and other recent trends in SMS
[3] ICAO. Annex 19 to the Convention on International Civil
Aviation: Safety Management. International Civil aviation
Organization, 2016.
[4] N. A Abdel Hady. Overview on draft 4th edition of
safety management manual – smm doc 9859 (summary of
changes). presentation on nclb – aerodrome certification
workshop/training. 2017.
[5] Regulation (eu) no 376/2014 of the european parliament
and of the council on the reporting, analysis and follow-
up of occurrences in civil aviation, amending regulation
(eu) no 996/2010 of the european parliament and of the
council and repealing directive 2003/42/ec of the european
parliament and of the council and commission regulations
(ec) no 1321/2007 and (ec) no 1330/ 2007., 2014.
[6] Commission implementing regulation (eu) 2015/1018 lay-
ing down a list classifying occurrences in civil aviation to
be mandatorily reported according to regulation (eu) no
376/2014 of the european parliament and of the council,
2015.
[7] Prague Airport. Prague airport web page, 2018. URL
http://prg.aero.
[8] European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation.
From safety-i to safety-ii: A white paper. 2013.
11
